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INTRODUCTION

American Indian. Gay. I am neither. Yet I propose, rather
presumptuously, I suppose, to discuss how the domestic law regarding the
first group-a body of law with its origins deep in the earliest days of the
Republic '-might affect the emerging law regarding the other-a body of
law as new as the last term of the United States Supreme Court and last
November's headlines. 2 The title of this essay is plaintive enough: what,
indeed, does one have to do with the other? Perhaps nothing; the editors of
this journal are frankly skeptical. But those of us who work in American

*
Robert A. Leflar Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Arkansas.
I. The first treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe was the Treaty
with the Delawares, proclaimed by the President on September 17, 1778. See Treaty with

the Delawares, Sept. 17, 1778, 7 Stat. 13, reprinted in 2 INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND

TREATIES 3, 4 (Charles J. Kappler ed., 1904). The first Supreme Court case that touched on
Indian affairs was Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch.) 87 (1810), though the proposition
established there was not one of American Indian law. The first truly Indian law case was
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
2.
The references, of course, are to the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), and the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court's
decision in Goodridge v. Mass. Dep't Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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Indian law are rather famous for seeing our issues in unlikely placesRennard Strickland once saw them in a pre-surrealistic painting; Robert A.
Williams, Jr. once saw them in a Papal Bull of Innocent IV in the 13th
Century;4 I once saw them in a science fiction story 5-and those editors
have generously offered me a forum, if I can make the connection. We
shall see.
This Symposium concerns the doctrines of equal protection, and I
begin in Part I with the observation that the application of standard
constitutional equal protection principles to American Indians has long
been somewhat problematic, as they appear to be becoming problematic, at
least in the context of marriage, with respect to gay men, lesbians,
bisexuals, transsexuals and others whose views regarding consensual sex
between adults do not match those of their straight fellows. In Part II, I
discuss what I call "definitional jurisprudence," that is to say the
foundational legal definitions of "tribe" and "marriage." As we shall see,
many scholars of American Indian law, myself included, have supported
the continuation of, and careful restrictions upon, the traditional and
historically accurate definition of an Indian tribe, and might be expected to
be sympathetic to those who urge a similarly traditional and historically
accurate definition of a marriage. In the end, I will find these two
occasions of definitional jurisprudence distinguishable, but I concede that
the arising of the gay-marriage issue and the construction of the present
essay have caused me to have to think carefully about those distinctions, as
I will set out below. In Part Im, I look at the issue of cross-boundary
difference, the role that it plays in American Indian law, and the threat to
those differences posed by the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the
Constitution, and its implementing legislation. These issues, it appears,
relate to the question of whether uniformity among the states--or, for that
matter, among the states and tribes-regarding the definition of marriage is
necessary or not. And, I will conclude in Part V, drawing on the concept
of the so-called "dominant society" as it is defined both in Indian law and
with regards to gay-marriage recognition. In the end, I will decide that, as

3.
Rennard Strickland, The Absurd Ballet of American Indian Policy, or American
Indian Struggling With Ape on Tropical Landscape: An Afterword, 31 ME. L. REV. 213
(1979).
4.
Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of FederalIndian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986 Wisc. L.
REV. 219 (1986).
5.
Robert Laurence, Civil Procedure in Low Earth Orbit: Science Fiction,
American Indiansand FederalCourts, 24 N.M. L. REV. 265 (1994).
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with much of American Indian law, the toleration of diversity represented
by a redefinition of marriage is acceptable and, indeed, is a good thing.
I.

INDIANS AND EQUAL PROTECTION

In three senses is the application of the Equal Protection Clause to
Indians problematic. The first sense flows from one of the most basic
principles of American Indian law, to wit that the United States
Constitution in general, and its Equal Protection Clause in particular, do not
bind the activities of Indian tribes. This result is sensible and flows directly
from the most basic of all Indian law principles, that tribes are recognized
under the domestic law of the United States as governments,6 capable of8
7
doing the kinds of things governments do, like taxing, incarcerating,
regulating, 9 adjudicating,' ° and so on. If a tribe is a government, then, it is
one older than the United States itself, and how could, and why should, the
organic document creating the United States work to bind the activities of a
more ancient government? And, indeed, in the case of Talton v. Mayes,"
the Supreme Court recognized that the Fifth Amendment of the
Constitution did not govern the prosecution of Bob Talton by the Cherokee
Tribe. 2
Thus, one may not argue that a certain action done by an American
Indian tribe violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment,' 3 or the one that we are told is implicit in the Fifth
Amendment.' 4 Congress reacted to this state of affairs, much after Talton
v. Mayes, by enacting in 1968, the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA),' 5 which
imposes on the tribe certain constitution-like restrictions, including the

6.

Chief Justice John Marshall dubbed them "domestic dependant nations" in

Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Justice Thurgood Marshall

wrote for the Court that their sovereignty did not derive from the United States in United
States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).

7. See, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Indian Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
8. See, e.g., United States v. Ant, 882 F.2d 1389 (8th Cir. 1989).
9.
See, e.g., South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993).
10.
See, e.g., Estate of Tasunke Witko v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 23 Indian L.
Rep. 6104, 6111 (Rosebud Sioux 1996). The legitimacy of this exercise of tribal civil
adjudicatory power was rejected in Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court,
133 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1998). See generally Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis:
One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, 22 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285 (1998).

I1. 163 U.S. 376 (1896).
12.

13.
14.
15.

Id.

U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1.
See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-03 (2001).
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16
admonition that it not deny any person "the equal protection of its laws."'
However, this protection has no civil-side application,17 and even in
criminal prosecutions this statutory protection is likely to be given a
somewhat different construction than its constitutional relative.' 8 This is
not to suggest that when litigating a civil matter in tribal court one is
without the customary guarantee of equality, for many tribes have a
tradition of equality under their broad notions of fairness that is quite
similar to the notions of the dominant society.19 Furthermore, the ICRA is
enforceable by tribal judges in tribal courts, even if it creates no civil cause
of action in federal courts. 20 Equal protection is not absent in tribal courts,
but constitutionalequal protection is problematic.
The second sense in which this is true flows from the holding of the
case of United States v. Antelope.2' Mr. Antelope was a member of the
Coeur d'Alene Indian Tribe and he killed a non-Indian, without malice
aforethought, but during the commission of a burglary upon the victim's
home. He was prosecuted for murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2000) and
the federal felony murder rule, and he mounted the following equal
protection defense: suppose, Mr. Antelope argued, I were not an Indian.
My prosecution then would be under Idaho law, because Supreme Court
doctrine places the prosecution of white-on-white crimes in state, not
federal court.22 Idaho has no felony murder rule, so were I not an Indian, I
would now be being prosecuted for manslaughter, not murder. This
disparity violates the equal protection component of the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.23
The Court rejected this argument and reversed the Ninth Circuit.2 4
The discrimination that Mr. Antelope suffered was not racial
discrimination, but more in the nature of political discrimination.
"[C]lassifications expressly singling out Indian tribes as subjects of
legislation are expressly provided for in the Constitution and supported by

16.
25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2001).
17.
Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
18.
See, e.g., White Eagle v. One Feather, 478 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1973). White
Eagle was decided prior to Martinez, at a time when federal courts were still accepting civil
cases challenging tribal activity under the Indian Civil Rights Act.
19.
See, e.g., Eberhart v. Eberhart, 24 Ind. L. Rep. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux
1997).
20.
Martinez, 436 U.S. at 65.
21.
430 U.S. 641 (1977).
22.
See Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896); United States v. McBrantney,
104 U.S. 621 (1881).
23.
This argument is set out in Antelope, 430 U.S. at 643-44.
24. Id.at 644.
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25
the ensuing history of the Federal Government's relations with Indians.
And, the Antelope Court quoted from Morton v. Mancari,26 the Court's
first-ever affirmative action case, involving promotional preferences at the
Bureau of Indian Affairs: "[tihe preference, as applied, is granted to
Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as members of quasisovereign tribal entities. 27
This explanation is not satisfying to everyone, and hence the
problematic nature of the application of equal protection to Indians. To
Mr. Antelope, I suspect, the explanation that he suffered the murder
prosecution because he was a member of an Indian tribe, and not because
he was an Indian, must have seemed legalistic or worse, similar to the
reaction of a pregnant woman upon hearing that she was being treated
differently not because of her gender but because she was pregnant. Or as
legalistic as Justice Scalia's explanation in Lawrence v. Texas, rejecting the
equal protection attack on the Texas sodomy law: "[o]n its face [the Texas
law] applies equally to all persons. Men and women, heterosexuals and
homosexuals, are all subject to its prohibition of deviate sexual intercourse
with someone of the same sex., 28 On the other side, Mr. Mancari and
other opponents of affirmative action probably saw a judicial sleight of
hand in the Court's explanation that the advantages that flowed to Indian
employees of the BIA came not because they were Indians, but because of
the state-to-state relationship of the United States to the Indian tribes.
The third sense in which the application of equal protection concepts
to Indians is problematic is through the recognition of Indian treaties as
part of the "supreme Law of the land, ' 29 still enforceable, and able to preempt conflicting state law.3 ° Consider, for example, the case of Minnesota
v. Mille Lac Band of Chippewa Indians.31 In the middle part of the
nineteenth century, the government took steps to remove the Chippewas
from what are now the states of Wisconsin and Minnesota. Treaties were
negotiated, signed and ratified in which the tribes and bands conveyed to
the United States most of the lands in those two states, retaining for
themselves reservations in what is now Minnesota, as well as offreservation usufructuary rights to hunt, fish and gather on the lands

25.
26.
27.
28.

29.
30.
31.

Id. at 645.
417 U.S. 535 (1974).
Id. at 554, quoted in Antelope, 430 U.S. at 645.
Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2494 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
526 U.S. 172 (1999).
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conveyed, and on the waters of Lake Michigan. Years later, the states
challenged the continued validity of those off-reservation rights.
Note now that these challenges were not strictly speaking, equal
protection challenges. But the gravamen of the non-Indians' complaint-at
least the non-Indian, non-lawyers' complaint-was surely equality based.
The treaty rights, after all, are rights not shared by Indians and non-Indians
alike, and many protests, especially of off-reservation, out-of-season rights
to hunt and fish, have been characterized by the protesters as being equality
based.32 And sure enough, as long as individual Indians may claim the
treaty rights obtained by their tribes, 33 they will remain rights guaranteed to
some, but not to all, as the supreme law of the land. Of course, from the
Indian perspective the answer to any claim of unfairness is plain: "you got
Wisconsin." But for many non-Indians living there now, it is easy to forget
or diminish the importance of the original deal, and to point to what seems
to them to be a present departure from the strict equality that they desire.
I have argued elsewhere that the recognition and enforcement of
Indian treaties is a justifiable and necessary departure from the concepts of
equality, but that Antelope was wrong. The correctness or not of Mancari
depends on whether one sees the BIA as truly a place that manages the
relationship among sovereigns, or just as another federal bureaucracy.34
But those discussions are beside the point in this essay; it is enough for
present purposes to note, as I did at the outset, that the dominant society's
constitutional principles of equality apply differently, and in ways that are
problematic, to Indians and their tribes.
I will return to this point shortly, but first let's turn our attention to the
questions of what is a "tribe," what is a "marriage," and what all the fuss is
about.

32.
FRANCIS PAUL PRUCHA, AMERICAN INDIAN TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A
POLITICAL ANOMALY 419-27, Plates 41-43 (1994) (showing treaty protesters alleging "equal
protection" violations). Professor Prucha, in discussing the "backlash" against treaty rights
in the 1960s and '70s, notes: "[t]he [anti-treaty] arguments were couched in terms of 'equal
rights' and 'equal opportunities' for all American citizens, and Indians were denounced as
'super citizens' because the courts recognized rights for them that were not accorded nonIndians." Id. at 423.
33.
That individual Indians are protected by the rights negotiated by their tribes was
recognized in United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 n.4 (1986).
34.

See Robert Laurence, Symmetry and Asymmetry in American Indian Law, 42

ARIz. L. REV.

861 (2000).
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II.

DEFINING A "TRIBE" AND A "MARRIAGE"

So, what is the problem with gay marriage? The most common thing
that one hears from the politicians and the talk show hosts is that a
"marriage" for the last 6,000 or 3,000 or 1,000 years, depending on who's
talking, has been defined to be a union between exactly one man and one
woman. 3 Anything else may be a "relationship," or a "partnership," or a
"couple," or a "union," but it is not a "marriage. 36 One can dispute, of
course, the limitation of a true traditional "marriage" to two people. The
same Old Testament that condemns homosexuality seems to accept
polygamy;37 King David, for instance, had three wives.38 Many societies in
the world even today accept the multiplicity of partners, 39 and, of course,
from the perspective of Rome, Henry VIII was a hexagamist. But I am not
qualified to be a historical nit-picker, and I decline to play the role. I will
concede the point to the opponents of gay-marriage recognition that it is
hard to find a religious or civilian text of long duration that accepts the
inclusion within the word "marriage" of a spiritual union of two men or
two women. 4° But cannot the definition be changed?

35.
For example, Governor Mitt Romney said on the Today Show: "I agree with
3,000 years of recorded human history, which frankly is a contradiction of what the majority
of the Supreme Judicial Court said." See generally Rick Klein, The Gay MarriageRuling
Spotlight on the Governor; Political Ramifications; Image on the Line, Romney Treads
Carefully, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 20, 2003, at BI0. "Of course," Governor Romney
continued on the Today Show, "at the same time, we should [be] providing the necessary
civil rights and certain appropriate benefits" to same-sex couples. Id.
36.
Related to the definition or redefinition of "marriage" is the same question, as it
relates to the word "family." That word, too, finds its way into the law. For example, in
Arkansas, the protection given to the homestead against the claims of creditors runs to
persons who are "married or the head of a family," ARK. CONST., art. 9, § 3, leading to the
inquiry of what is a "family."
Such a question always comes down to what the drafters intended, but it seems
to me that we often take a more flexible definition of "family" than we do of "marriage."
Family histories, including my own, are replete with occasions of unrelated children,
brought home from the cemetery after a funeral, who become as much members of the
family as the children of blood.
37.

See generally, EVANGELICAL DICTIONARY OF THEOLOGY 861 (Walter A. Elwell,

ed. 1996) ("While the Bible does not directly condemn the plural marriages that occurred in
the [Old Testament], it frankly describes the evil effects of polygamy").
38.
See II Sam. 13:1-29.
39.
See Adrien Katherine Wing, Polygamy from Southern Africa to Black Britannia
to Black America: Global Critical Race Feminism as Legal Reform for the Twenty-First
Century, I I J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 811 (2001).
40.
See Harry D. Krause & David D. Meyer, American Law in a Time of Global
Interdependence: U.S. National Reports to the XVIth International Congress of
Comparative Law: Section II: What Familyfor the 21st Century?, 50 AM. J.COMP. L. 101
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From the American Indian law perspective, the question of the
redefinition of marriage so as to include units previously left out of the
definition suggests the question of tribal recognition. That is to say, when
the federal or a state government sets out to recognize a group of people as
an "Indian tribe," how does it do so? The issue arises in two ways, one
theoretical and one practical.
The theoretical question is why all groups within the United States are
not entitled, as Indian tribes are, "to make their own laws and be ruled by
them"? 4 1
Why must African-Americans, Muslims, model rocket
enthusiasts, women, horse owners, and, for that matter, gays and lesbians,
participate in American government as individuals or as members of
private, voluntary organizations, while the United States recognizes the
rights of American Indians to form themselves into governments? The
reason, of course, is historical, and can be stated succinctly: they were here
first. The Founding Fathers, and before them the British Colonial Fathers
chose early on to deal with the tribes on a state-to-state basis, and we live
still with that early decision. We, in fact, live with it more than do many
other governments around the world.43 To me, that adds to the strength of
the nation, but that's debatable, I guess; take the course.
Indians are understandably jealous of the uniqueness of the status of
their tribes, cling to it tenuously and sometimes desperately, and resist the
application of the principle of self-determination to groups other than
Native Americans. 44 Why would it hurt them to accept the notion of a
"tribe" of women or a "tribe" of observant Jews or a "tribe" of LithuanianAmericans? Because the Indians' uniqueness is justified on unique
historical grounds and serves as one of the few remaining aspects of the
way things were pre-contact. What about the recognition as a "tribe" of a
group of New Age crystal gazers, or a commune of aging hippies and their
naked children, or a party of neolithic re-enacters? That would be even
worse, for it makes a game out of sometimes tragic historical fact.
The practical, as opposed to the theoretical, side of tribal recognition,
deals with how the federal government reacts to the petitions of groups said
to be made up of persons of genetic, pre-contact blood, who have been left
out of the five hundred or so presently recognized tribes. As a few
examples out of many possible, consider the cases of the Northern
(2002).
41.
42.
43.

Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
See generally, PRUCHA, supra note 32.
See generally, ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: NATIVE
NATIONS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1447-1583 (4th ed. 2003).
44.
See Robert N. Clinton, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples as Collective Group
Rights, 32 ARIz. L. REV. 739 (1990).
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Cherokees,45 the Western Cherokees,4 6 the Southern Cherokees 47 and the
Lost Cherokees.4 8 Each of these groups claims to be a "tribe," made up of
the descendants of Cherokees who dropped out along the way of the
infamous Trail of Tears, as the government ushered the Cherokee Tribe
from its ancestral homelands in the southeastern part of the continent to its
new homeland in what is now Oklahoma. "Ethnic cleansing" we would
call it today. Some Cherokees stayed behind and these are the ancestors of
the Eastern Band of Cherokees, which the federal government recognizes
as a "tribe." Most made the trip all the way to Oklahoma, and their
descendants are now called The Cherokee Nation; it, too, is recognized by
the United States. So, too, is the United Keetoowah Band, a smaller group
of present day Cherokees that claims, in fact, to be the true and legitimate
government of the Cherokee Nation. 49 But other Cherokees did not walk
the entire Trail of Tears, and stopped along the way in Tennessee, Missouri
or Arkansas. They settled in, often passing for white, and when the
Cherokee Nation reorganized itself early in the twentieth century in
Oklahoma, they were left off the rolls. These are the Northern, Southern,
Western and Lost Cherokees.
It takes a man more cynical than I to doubt the truth of the claims of
many of these people that they are descended from the Cherokees who did
not make it all the way to Oklahoma.5 ° Why, then, are they not Indians,
nor members of recognized Indian tribes? The Cherokee Nation doesn't
want them, 5' and principles of self-government leave that decision to that
tribe.52 But why not recognize the groups as free-standing tribes? When

45.
See, e.g., Laura Kellams, Tribe's Attempt to Gain State Recognition Stalls;
Questions Raised on What Status Carries," ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETtE, Feb. 16, 2003, at
BI.
46.
See, e.g., Cheryl Whitsitt & Steve J.P. Liang, A Power Struggle Among the
Amonsoquath," SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER, Jan. 5, 2003, at IA.
47.
See, e.g., Boat Meant for Casino Leaves State, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 25, 2003,

at A12.

48.
See, e.g., Adam Welsh, Search for Roots Spurs Try to Form Tribes, ARK.
DEMOCRAT-GAZElTE (Northwest), Dec. 3, 200 1, at B 1.
49.

See generally GEORGIA

RAE LEEDS,

THE

UNITED KEETOOWAH

BAND OF

CHEROKEE INDIANS IN OKLAHOMA (1996).
50.
But see Wendy Grossman, Tribal Warfare: Caroll Cocchia Says She's OneThird Indian, and is Trying to Bring Local Native Americans Together; Detractors Say
She's White, and is Helping to Tear Them Apart, HOUSTON PRESS, Feb. 21, 2002 at
http://www.houstonpress.com/issues/2002-02-2I/feature2.html.
51.
See, e.g., Adam Welsh, Tribes Ask Recognition; Established Groups Eschew
'Quasi-Tribes,'ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Dec. 3, 2001, at B 1.
52.
Roff v. Burney, 168 U.S. 218 (1896). See generally, CLINTON, supra note 43,
at 391-405.
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the Cherokee Nation advocates against such recognition,53 it is partly, one
suspects, on the grounds that it would further divide up an already toosmall pie of federal support for tribes. But more than that, again, is the
historical uniqueness of the concept of an Indian tribe, and the fear of the
diminishment of that uniqueness if the government is too quick to
recognize other groups as being legitimate off-shoots of the true Cherokee
Tribes.
All of this, I must say, sounds to my ear very similar to the arguments
of the marriage-traditionalists arguing against the recognition of gay
marriage. When asked directly why it would diminish one's heterosexual
marriage for the state to recognize the legitimacy of a gay marriage,
defenders of traditional marriage give answers that sound strikingly like the
answer the Cherokee Nation gives when asked about the harm that would
flow from the recognition of, say, the "Northern Cherokee Tribe."
Something like this: it harms because it distorts historical fact and cuts
back on our deserved uniqueness. So, the principal question of the present
essay arises: are these questions of definitional jurisprudence
distinguishable?
As mentioned in the Introduction, I believe the two questions are
different, and, in fact, almost the opposite, one from another. When a
group of people is recognized as an "Indian tribe," it is permitted a degree
of separation from the rest of society, a kind of freewill segregation, if you
54
will, entitling them to "make their own laws and be ruled by them.,
When a group of people, usually two, are recognized as being "married,"
on the other hand, they are permitted to join with the dominant society and
not to be separated from the majority of their fellow citizens.55 An
expansive definition of a tribe, therefore, implicates separation and
division, while an expansive definition of a marriage implicates inclusion
and unification.
Not only are the implications of the recognition of tribes and
marriages tending in opposite directions, but the costs and benefits to the
dominant society are very different. When the United States government
chooses to recognize an Indian tribe, it gains several things. First, and
perhaps most important, it gains the dignity that comes from promisekeeping, through the continued validity of the early treaties, whereby what
is now the dominant society came to possess most of the continent. The
first President Bush said in his inaugural address, "[g]reat nations like great
men must keep their word. When America says something, America

53.
54.
55.

See Welsh, supra note 51.
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220 (1959).
See Goodridge v. Mass. Dep't Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
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means it, whether a treaty or an agreement or a vow made on marble
steps., 56 It is, of course, entirely unclear that the new President was
intending his remark to refer to Indian treaties. In fact, it would be
remarkable if any modern President would turn the nation's attention to
Indian affairs in an inaugural address.57 Nevertheless, as a general matter I
believe President George H.W. Bush's remark rang true to many American
ears, and the refusal to recognize tribal nationhood and Indian treaties
would diminish, in substantial degree, the greatness of America.
When the dominant society recognizes a tribe whose historical
existence is proved, it gains, too, in its faithfulness to historical accuracy.58
Recognizing the existence of the Cherokee Nation, whose corporate
existence can be traced back to pre-contact days, is faithful to history in
ways that recognizing the existence of the Northern Cherokee Tribe, let
alone a "tribe" of New Age adherents, is not.
Next, with the dominant society's acceptance of the unique status of
Indian tribes comes a rejection of the "melting pot" view of the American
ideal. I am of a sufficient age to have been raised under that ideal, whose
origins were metallurgical: an alloy from a melting pot is stronger than any
of the individual constituent metals that were melted into it.
Notwithstanding my upbringing, however, I now have come to appreciate
the alternative "beef stew" ideal, whose origins are culinary: a stew, while
being held together by a common gravy, still must have recognizable
chunks of beef, carrot, onion, parsnip, and so forth; over-cooked, it
becomes mush. While the exact value of diversity remains hotly debated in
America, and the question of how much carrot and how much gravy is a
legitimate one, it seems to me that the 21st century both here and abroad is
destined to be one of stew and not alloy, and the recognition of the
separateness of the tribes is consistent with that trend.
And the costs of the recognition of tribes? Well, of course, diversity
can be disruptive of national quietude. Homogeneous places - like

56.
Inaugural Address, I PUB. PAPERS OF GEORGE BUSH 1, 3 (1989). Students of
Indian law recognized the first sentence in this quotation as almost identical to a sentence
from Justice Black's dissent in Fed. Power Comm'n v. TuscaroraIndian Nation, 362 U.S.
99, 142 (1960) (Black, J. dissenting). President Bush substituted "must" for Justice Black's
"should." See id.
57.
I explore this point in more detail in Robert Laurence, Antipodean Reflections
on American Indian Law, 20 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 533 (2003).
58.
The precise mechanics of governmental recognition of tribes is beyond the
scope of the present essay. See 25 C.F.R. § 83.7. See also Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury
Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (Ist Cir. 1979); Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe v.
Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975). See generally DAVID H. GETCHES Er AL., FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 352-58 (4th ed. 1998); CLINTON, supra note 43, at 123-29.
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Norway, Hungary or Thailand, for instance---or, indeed, like Navajo, Hopi
or Nez Perce-tend to be more tranquil communities, where harmony is a
common theme. 59 For my tastes, stew is tastier and more interesting than
alloy, but-surely to push the metaphor too far-the different tastes
compete within the gravy and the result can be palatine discord. There have
been eras in American history when the government's policy toward the
Indians was very frankly assimilative. 60 During these eras, ethnic cleansing
was accomplished not via removal of the Indians to the west, but by
merging them to the point of disappearance into the American alloy, for the
ultimate purpose of acquiring their land, of course, but also for the purpose
the discord that can, and has, resulted from having them
of eliminating
6
among us. 1
For another cost paid by the government for the policy that recognizes
tribal separation from the dominant society, I return to the prior discussion
of equal protection. For it is true that the existence of a body of law known
as American Indian law, including, as it does, the different treatment of the
tribes, entails at least a technical departure from the pristine niceties of
traditional equal protection analysis. 62 As we have seen, even if Antelope

The editors of this journal understandably seek authority for this proposition,
59.
but I am afraid I must fall back on nothing more than place dropping: I've been to these
places and they seem tranquil to me. And surely it goes without saying, doesn't it, that
when a community is of a generally like-mind with respect to, say, religion, then there will
be fewer and quieter disputes in that community over matters of religion. Hence, Norway,
made up mostly of Lutherans, and Thailand, made up mostly of Buddhists, tend to be
religiously more congenial places than Northern Ireland or Nigeria, where sharp differences
exist over matters of religion. Or, when everyone speaks the same language, as in Hungary,
there will be fewer language rights issues than in countries with linguistic diversity, such as
Canada.
This is not, of course, to say that generally homogeneous places have no
diversity: Norway has its Sami people, Hungary its Roma, and Thailand has small Christian
and Muslim communities. See Jane Perlez, Cracks in Thailand's Peace: Attacks in a Mostly
Buddhist Nation Fuels Religious Tensions in an Islamic Outpost, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004,
at A8. And, of course, Lutherans and Buddhists have their own internal schisms, so
harmony does not always reign. Nevertheless, it remains a truism, I believe-at least an
American truism-that a diverse society is both more stimulating and less tranquil.
For a post-modern discussion of the disruptive effects of diversity in an
education setting, see Garrick B. Pursley, Note: Thinking Diversity, Rethinking Race:
Toward a Transformative Concept of Diversity in Higher Education, 82 TEX. L. REV. 153
(2003).
60.
See generally GETCHES, supra note 58, at 63-253. The most recent of these
assimilative periods was during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations. See id. at 20421.
61.
See generally CLINTON, supra note 43, at 39-41; GETCHES, supra note 58, at
204-24.
62.
See discussion, supra Part I.

2004]

AMERICAN INDIAN LAWAND GAY MARRIAGE RECOGNITION?

and Mancari were decided incorrectly, there is still the matter of the
"special rights" contained in the treaties, and the matter of non-application
of the Constitution to tribal activity from Talton v. Mayes,63 hence a
different kind of equal protection will necessarily prevail, once the
government chooses the path of recognizing separate tribal entities. All of
American Indian law is premised on the principle that this departure from
standard analysis is justified because of the benefits that flow to the
dominant society from that recognition, and to this premise I
unconditionally adhere. But, it cannot be denied that a cost is there to be
borne.
Now consider the benefits and costs to the dominant society of the
acceptance of a definition of "marriage" that includes couples of the same
gender. Here, with respect to equal protection, the cost found in tribal
recognition becomes a benefit of gay-marriage recognition, for the latter
advances, rather than narrows, the application of equal protection
principles, and gay couples are no longer excluded from dominant-society
marriage. 64 Concomitantly, the harm that comes from the recognition of
gay-marriage is one of the benefits of tribal recognition, that is to say, a
departure from historical accuracy, conceding for now the history advanced
by the traditionalists. Thus, because the implications of tribal recognition
and gay-marriage recognition tend in opposite directions, these costs and
benefits are reflective of each other, but in opposite directions.
But one further benefit flows to the dominant society through the
recognition of gay marriage, and that is the expansion of the stability of
family relationships and the institutionalization to the gay community of
the inertia of marriage. The stereotype of the unmarried gay relationship-more of gay men than of lesbians-is one of promiscuity, which, like many
stereotypes is likely an overstatement of an observation with at least a
kernel of truth. I will not be the first to observe the irony of criticizing a
group as promiscuous while at the same time denying that group access to
marriage, the very institution that is the principal obstacle to promiscuity in
the dominant society. It seems reasonably straightforward to me to
conclude that the recognition of gay marriage would benefit the dominant
society by adding a substantial degree of stability to gay relationships.65
Thus can be seen a certain symmetry to the discussion: the principal
downside of tribal recognition--departure from equal protection norms-

63.
163 U.S. 376 (1896).
64.
Goodridge v. Mass. Dep't Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
65.
The conservative commentators David Brooks and William Safire famously
agree. See William Safire, On Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at A23;
David Brooks, The Power of Marriage,N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 2003, at A15.
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becomes a gain from the recognition of gay marriage. And vice versa: an
upside of tribal recognition-faithfulness to historical traditions-becomes
a cost of gay-marriage recognition. I appraise these symmetric costs and
benefits as being a wash, canceling each other out and leaving behind the
true gains: President Bush's "Great Nation" principle of promise-keeping
via the recognition of treaties, and the strength provided by diversity, on
the one hand, and the increased stability of families, on the other. There
are costs to both tribal recognition and gay-marriage recognition, but I
deem these costs worth the payment. Both types of recognition-both the
one that recalls historical tradition and the one that does not; the one that
advances equal protection and the one that does not-are justified based
upon the ultimate gains to the dominant society.
Ill.

CROSS-BOUNDARY DIFFERENCES, THE THEORY OF BOUNDARIES AND
THE PERILS OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT66

A second place where the principles of American Indian law might
bear upon the issue of gay-marriage recognition regards the cross-boundary
recognition of judgments, an uncommonly litigated topic, 67 but one
regularly debated in the law reviews. 68 The enforcement of a judgment in a
jurisdiction other than the one that rendered it is, in one sense, a mundane
part of the practice of law. But in another sense it captures the deeply
jurisprudential question of the cross-boundary respect given to the judicial
acts of another community. As such it goes right to the heart of what
Indian law is all about, that is to say the differences that exist between the
on- and off-reservation ways of doing things.

I had fruitful discussions with my colleague Chauncey E. Brummer about the
66.
issues discussed below, for which I am grateful. Errors are mine alone, as are the
conclusions, with which my colleague may not agree.
67.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997); Eberhart v.
Eberhart, 24 Ind. L. Rep. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux 1997).
68.
See, e.g., Robert N. Clinton, Tribal Courts and the Federal Union, 26
WILLAMEITE L. REV. 841 (1990); Daina B. Garonzik, Comment: Full Reciprocity for
Tribal Courts from a Federal Courts Perspective: A ProposedAmendment to the Full Faith
and Credit Act, 45 EMORY L. J. 723 (1996); Robert Laurence, The Bothersome Need for
Asymmetry in Any Federally Dictated Rule of Recognition for the Enforcement of Money
Judgments Across Indian Reservation Boundaries, 27 CONN. L. REV. 979 (1995); Robert
Laurence, Full Faith and Credit in Tribal Courts: An Essay on Tribal Sovereignty, CrossBoundary Reciprocity and the Unlikely Case of Eberhard v. Eberhard, 28 N.M. L. REV. 19

(1998).
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What I call "the theory of boundaries" entails five observations,
not
69
limited to Indian reservation boundaries, and here only briefly stated:
1. Cross-boundarydifferences surely exist.
Pick a boundary: Greece - Turkey. U.S - Canada. Nevada - Utah.
North Dakota - Standing Rock Sioux. Madison County - Washington

County. To one degree or another, things are done differently on one side
of the boundary from the way things are done on the other side.
Differences across county lines, state lines and international frontiers range
from small to dramatic depending on the locale, and may be as minor as the
personalities who administer very similar laws, or as major as the kinds of
things that people fight wars and kill each other over. The very existence
of a boundary implies different ways of doing things.
2. Some are less conspicuous than they used to be.
Cultural diffusion and cross-boundary osmosis tend to diminish these
differences over time, so that, for example, as Indians became, over time,
more and more Christian and more and more speakers of English and more
and more Visa card users and pickup truck buyers, the difference between
the way things are done on- and off-reservation began to diminish. So, too,
with the boundaries between the nations of Europe. So, too, with the states
of the United States.
3. Some are illusory; others are benign.
There are those, viewing across a boundary from the perspectives of
xenophobia or racism, who have their own reasons for overstating the
extent of these differences. My emphasis is, in fact, on difference and not
sameness, but it is important to concede early on that at least with respect
to close-by boundaries, few cross-boundary differences are malignant.
Canadians have a health insurance system different from ours, but they
don't sacrifice their babies. Indian tribal courts may be attached to
methods of dispute resolution that are considered "alternate" offreservation, but those courts are neither kangaroo nor Star Chamber.
4. The real differences are important to the people on both sides of
the boundary.
But recognizing that many cross-boundary differences are illusory,
small, or benign is not to deny that important differences do exist, and these
differences implicate very important aspects of peoples' lives. I like to say
that there are things that one is prohibited from doing in Utah that one is
required to do in Nevada, but this is only a light-hearted way of observing
that the two states treat very differently the questions of whether peddling

69.
For a more complete discussion, see Robert Laurence, The Convergence of
Cross-Boundary Enforcement Theories in American Indian Law: An Attempt to Reconcile
Full Faith and Credit, Comity and Asymmetry, 18 QUIN. L. REV. 115 (1999).
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sex for cash, or spending one's money in the pursuit of a 22-black payout,
is legitimate or not. 70 The legal systems of Arkansas and Mississippi, quite
similar in many ways, make very different judgments regarding the
legitimacy of high interest rates 7' or the amount of one's property that
should be shielded from one's creditors.7 2
5. Most of the people on one side or another prefer their ways of
doing things to the way they are done on the other side.
As my friend Sam Deloria, Director of the American Indian Law
Center in Albuquerque, likes to say, when people on one side of a boundary
explain to people on the other side about how the first group does things
and how they structure their community, one should not expect to hear the
sound of ten thousand palms slapping ten thousand foreheads: "Damn.
Why didn't we think of that?" Rather, one should expect the reaction to be,
in general: "Why, that's very interesting. That's the way you do it, eh?
We prefer to do it our way." True, over time, boundaries tend to be
permeable, but at the very least in the short run-"short run" being on
occasion several hundred years or so-they provide a barrier, protective of
the way things are done at home, "home" being both sides of the boundary.
Now, there are two ways in which this briefly stated theory of
boundaries might be brought into the present discussion. I could refer to
the "boundary" that exists between the gay, lesbian, bisexual and
transsexual community or communities and the dominant society, and talk
about the differences across this "line," a line that is metaphorical only.
Some of those differences are real, some are illusory, some are informed
more by homophobia and homo-aversion than by reality. Many affect
primary areas of the lives of people who live on opposite sides of this
"line," and it is relatively rare for people to change sides. Rather, they tend
to prefer their own ways.
But, instead, I wish to go in another direction, and discuss the
traditional, and real, boundaries that exist between the states of the Union.
And here it requires no keen insight to observe that from one jurisdiction to
another across the United States, attitudes differ regarding the legitimacy of
gay-marriage. These attitudes might be roughly collected into these three
groups: (1) abhorrence; (2) that's not the way we do things here; and (3)

70.
Any mention of gambling in an article dealing with Indian law requires
acknowledgment of the extent to which the growth of on-reservation casino gambling has
changed both the reality of life on many reservations and the cross-boundary view that
members of the dominant society have of Indians. The changes can hardly be gainsaid, but
a more complete discussion is beyond the scope of this article.
71.
Compare ARK. CONST., art. 19, § 13 with Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-17-1 (1972).
72.
Compare ARK. CONST., art. 9, §§ 1-2 with MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-3-1 (1972).
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live and let live. 73 The question then becomes whether the law will allow
different jurisdictions with different attitudes about gay marriage to retain
those differences.
There is talk, of course, about amending the Constitution to deny the
states the freedom to define the word "marriage" more expansively than the
traditional definition.74 This is the flip-side, then, of Loving v. Virginia,75
where the Fourteenth Amendment was found to prohibit the states from
making a more restrictive definition of marriage in order to prohibit
miscegenation. We shall see if such an amendment comes to pass; similar
76
proposals were made to prohibit flag-burning following Texas v. Johnson,
but so far those proposals have come to nothing.7 7 There is also the
possibility that the present Constitution would come to be interpreted to
prohibit a state from refusing to recognize gay marriages, a step the present

73.
The intermediate category of "that's not the way we do things here" is intended
to convey the local community's sense, short of aversion or abhorrence, that the rule from
abroad is not one that they favor. For example, consider Etheridge v. Shaddock, 706
S.W.2d 395 (Ark. 1986). In that case, Eva Jean and Donald Ray Etheridge were married in
Arkansas and then divorced here, with Donald getting custody of the children. Later,
Donald married his first cousin Anna Delozier, in Arkansas where, popular conceptions to
the contrary, a marriage between first cousins is incestuous, prohibited and, indeed,
criminal. See ARK. CODE ANN. §9-11-106 (Michie 1987). Eva Jean petitioned the court for
a change in the custody arrangements of her children, grounds for the petition being the
incestuous marriage. In response to the petition to rearrange the custody, Donald and his
cousin had the Arkansas marriage annulled and they subsequently traveled to Texas to be
married there, where a marriage between first cousins is not prohibited. See Etheridge, 706
S.W.2d at 396. The Arkansas Supreme Court held that while marriages between first
cousins are against Arkansas public policy, "such a marriage does not create 'much social
alarm,' so that the marriage will be recognized if it was valid by the law of the state in
which it took place." Etheridge at 396, quoting ROBERT A. LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN
CONFLICTS LAW § 221 (4th ed. 1986). Uncited, but supportive of the Court's opinion would
be ARK. CODE ANN. §9-11-107, speaking to the validity of foreign marriages. Also uncited,
and perhaps inconsistent with the Court's opinion would be ARK. CODE ANN. §9-11-106(b)
making marriages between first cousins a crime. Furthermore the Court did not note that
Dr. Leflar went on in §221 of his treatise to write that "results may be varied on similar sets
of facts by reason of the issue in the particular lawsuit." LEFLAR, supra this note. That is to
say that the Court should have taken the time to analyze whether the general rule should be
followed in this particular case regarding the custody of a child. In that context, it is
difficult for me to see why it might be grounds for a review of custody arrangements to be
sleeping with one's cousin in Arkansas, but that the grounds disappear merely because the
incest is certified as proper by the State of Texas.
74. See, e.g., Elisabeth Busmiller, Bush Backs Ban in Constitution on Gay
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at Al.
75.
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
76. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
77.
But see, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Clark Backs Flag Burning Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
12, 2003, at A2.
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Court is plainly not yet ready to take. 78 For present purposes let us suppose
that the Constitution is neither interpreted to require gay-marriage
recognition nor amended to outlaw it. The question becomes one, then, of
Full Faith and Credit versus comity.
The Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution 79 is a large
component of the glue that holds our Union together, shown as well as
anything by the fact that its implementing legislation is one of our
country's oldest laws.80 The states are required, by constitutional and
congressional command, to recognize, though not always to enforce, 8' the
judgments of other states. In the Framers' plan, Arkansas would treat a
judgment from Illinois pretty much as Arkansas treats the judgments from
its own courts. 82 It is for this reason, among others, that we call the states
"sisters. 8 3
From an American Indian law perspective, the salient feature of Full
Faith and Credit is that it allows for no public policy exception. 84 The
states are commanded to recognize each others' judgments even if based on
a policy of the rendering state that is inconsistent with the policy choices of
the receiving state. 85 That's fine for a family of sister states, but when the
more numerous, more ancient, and now very small and fragile Indian tribes
are brought into the mix, the "family" becomes less nuclear, and Full Faith
and Credit can represent a real threat to the tribal community.
Full Faith and Credit's threat to the tribes does not come, of course,
from the recognition of tribal judgments by the states, and in my experience

78.
See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2428. "[This case] does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek
to enter." Id. "Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex relations-the asserted state
interest in this case--other reasons exist to promote the institution of marriage beyond mere
moral disapproval of an excluded group." Id. at 2488 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
79.
U.S. CONST., art. IV, §1.
80.
28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994). The initial version of this statute was enacted in
1790. See LEFLAR, supra note 73, at 216 n.3.
81.
States use their own statutes of limitations and their own exemption laws,
meaning that some judgments enforceable in the state where rendered are unenforceable in
another state, either because the judgment is deemed to old to be enforced in the receiving
state or because the defendant owns no non-exempt property there. LEFLAR, supra note 73,
at 216-17.
82.
See, e.g., Durham v. Ark. Dep't of Human Serv., 912 S.W.2d 412 (Ark. 1995).
83. The equality of the states in the Senate, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 3, cl. l, and the
reflection of the Senate in the Electoral College, U.S. CONST., art II, § I, cl. 2, also play a
role in this sisterly statehood.
84.
See Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222 (1998). See generally LEFLAR,
supra note 73, at 224-25.
85.
Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). See generally LEFLAR, supra note 73,
at 224.
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many tribal judges yearn for the respect for their courts and their laws that
comes from the recognition of their judgments abroad, this being an
attitude, I take it, that they share with judges everywhere.86 But incoming
judgments are the problem, and some tribal judges can be expected to be
suspicious of having to enforce off-reservation judgments, based, perhaps,
on state policies inconsistent with on-reservation laws, customs and
traditions. At base, this is a worry, perhaps, of becoming little more than
collection agencies for off-reservation car dealerships.87 More broadly, it is
the fear that the enforcement of an incoming judgment could cause a
disruption of the small, homogeneous tribal society, a fear that is hardly a
factor when a judgment travels in the opposite direction. The smallest state
is still much larger than the largest tribe, and the typical state is much,
much larger than the typical tribe. California is roughly fifteen thousand
times larger than the Acoma Pueblo, but the Pueblo is roughly fifteen times
older.88 It is difficult to call such a couple "sisters," and it is difficult not to
concede that the enforcement of a California judgment in Acoma represents
a greater threat to Acoma stability, if it conflicts with Acoma tradition, than
does the enforcement of an Acoma judgment in California.
Therein lies the peril of Full Faith and Credit to Indian tribes, and
while there are law review commentators who advocate its application,8 9
and a few courts that have imposed it, 90 more courts have been more
comfortable using a regime of comity for the cross-boundary recognition of
tribal and state judgments. 9 Full Faith and Credit still plays a role

86.
This observation is purely impressionistic and I know of no careful study of the
attitudes of judges, tribal or state, to the issues of the cross-boundary enforcement of
judgments. However, I have spent many years discussing these issues with a non-random
collection of judges, and I have yet to hear a judge complain that his or her judgments are
given too much respect in another jurisdiction. I have heard judges complain, though, of
having to enforce another judge's judgment, these complaints coming from both tribal and
state judges.
87.
This characterization was first made, I believe, in informal comments by Philip
S. Deloria, Director of the American Indian Law Center in Albuquerque, in discussions
around the Center's conference table, in July of 1998.
88.
I am using here these rough estimates: that the population of California is
around 35 million, and the population of the Acoma Pueblo is around three thousand (this
latter figure is subject to some dispute, see www.cwis.org/fwdp/Resolutions/
Tribal/acoma7.txt (last visited January 16, 2003)), and that the founding of Acoma Pueblo
was in around 1100 A.D., while the Republic of California was organized in 1846.
89.
See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 68.
90.
See, e.g., Jim v. CIT Fin. Serv. Corp., 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975); Halwood v.
Cowboy Auto Sales, 946 P.2d 1088 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997); Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 Ind. L.
Rep. 6059 (Cheyenne River Sioux, 1997).
91.
See, e.g., Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997). Cases are
exhaustively collected in Eberhard, 24 Ind. L. Rep. at 6065, n.3.
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however, because if one state, say New Mexico, recognizes a tribal court
judgment and grants it Full Faith and Credit, then what was originally a
tribal court judgment becomes a New Mexico judgment, and that New
Mexico judgment must be recognized by, say, Illinois, notwithstanding its
tribal origins.9 2
Now, what of gay-marriage recognition? Marriage, of course, is not a
judgment, so the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not apply, and states are
free to refuse to recognize sister state marriages that run afoul of local
sensibilities.9 3 Under comity, a state may respect its sister's different
policy choice, but it need not honor it, nor implement it as its own. Such
issues already arise with respect to differing state views of when a marriage
is underage and when it is incestuous, as they used to arise, pre-Loving,
regarding mixed-race marriages, and they seem to present no particular
problems of national import.94
Of course, judgments do arise in situations relating to marriage, most
commonly when the marriage ends and judgments are entered requiring the
payment of support or the division of property. Here Full Faith and Credit
may well come into play, though the modifiability of the classic support
award makes the initial determination of support, at least, not a final
judgment to which Full Faith and Credit attaches.95 Support arrearages,
though, and property settlement debts become final judgments upon
rendering and are enforceable in other states, notwithstanding that other
state's policy determinations regarding divorce, subject, as always, to the
receiving state's statute of limitations and exemptions laws.9 6
So, suppose two men get married in a state that accepts the propriety
of that, and then they divorce. Final judgments are rendered dividing
property and these are presented for enforcement in a state where the men
could not have been married in the first place. This situation seems little
different to me from the situation where two young teenagers marry in a

92.
As far as I know, this theory was first set forth and applied to Indian law by
Hon. Richard Ransom, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New Mexico. See

Richard E. Ransom et al., Recognizing and Enforcing State and Tribal Judgments: A
Roundtable Discussion of Law, Policy and Practice, 18 AM. IND. L. REv. 239 (1993). It is

possible for a state to allow enforcement of a foreign judgment under its laws respecting
execution process, without actually granting its own judgment, which would be entitled to
Full Faith and Credit elsewhere. In fact, the commonly enacted 1964 version of the Act
does exactly that, though not every court interpreting that Uniform Act has made this
distinction. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS ACT, 13(I) U.S.A. 160 (2002).
93.
See generally LEFLAR, supra note 73, § 221.
94.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Custer, 21 A.2d 524 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1941).
95.
See LEFLAR, supra note 73, at 247 n. 12.
96.
Id.
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state where they are considered competent to do so, divorce, judgments are
entered dividing their property, and those judgments are presented for
enforcement in a state where they could never have been married in the
first place. It is the conclusion of the Full Faith and Credit Clause that for
the sake of the Union, these incoming judgments should be enforced, just
as if they were judgments based on contracts between the parties, or based
on torts committed by one against the other. It is really neither here nor
there what particular causes of action, based on what particular public
policies, gave rise to the judgments themselves.
That a system of comity for the recognition of marriage should work
in twenty-first century America is suggested by the way that such a system
works between and among the states and the tribes. That a system of Full
Faith and Credit for the recognition of marriage-based, or more commonly,
divorce-based judgments should work in twenty-first century America is
suggested by the present workings of that very system regarding underage
and incestuous marriages.9 7 There are those who would approve of Full
Faith and Credit for marriage as well as divorce, as there are surely those
who would approve of comity for both, this in addition to those who
advocate interpreting the Constitution to require gay-marriage recognition,
or amending it to prohibit such recognition.
And this is the state of the present jurisprudence regarding crossboundary recognition of tribal and state judgments: some advocates want
more Full Faith and Credit and some want more comity. 98 (The extremists
are among us too, and there are those who would wipe out all tribal court
jurisdiction, at least over non-Indians, 99 while there are others who would
have tribal court judgments treated as if they were foreign-nation
judgments.)1°° Comity seems to be winning, though all recognize that Full
Faith and Credit comes into the picture when any single state determines to
give full recognition to a tribal judgment. The Indian law lesson here
would seem to be that a regime composed both of Full Faith and Credit and
of comity can work, day-to-day, on the ground, especially with the good
faith cooperation of the jurisdictions involved. High-profile cases will

97.
See id. at §§ 220-21.
Probably the best source setting out the various positions in this debate is
98.
Ransom, supra note 92.
99.
See Timothy R. Malone & Bradley B. Furber, Civil Jurisdiction of Indian
Tribes Over Nonmembers: The Supreme Court Sheds New Light on an Old Problem, 8 NAT.
RESOURCE & ENV'T 83, 85-86 (1993).
100.
See Robert B. Porter, A Proposal to the Hanodaganyas to Decolonize Federal
Indian Control Law, 31 U. MICH. J. L. REF. 899, 998 (1998).
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arise, and these may challenge that cooperation, but, in the end, usually,
good faith wins out.
And finally this: the perils of Full Faith and Credit are much more in
evidence between and among the states and the tribes than between and
among the sister states. The threat that dominant society policies weighs
on the very ancient, very fragile, very homogeneous tribal communities is
not replicated amongst the states, and it is difficult to imagine a situation
where Full Faith and Credit would place in jeopardy the local sensibilities
of the receiving state. 0 1
IV. CONCLUSION: THE DOMINANT SOCIETY FROM Two DIFFERENT
PERSPECTIVES

Throughout this paper I have used, as I usually do in Indian law
papers, the expression "the dominant society" to refer to non-Indian
America. It is a better term than Anglo-America, because the dominant
society is made up, as well, of non-Anglo European-Americans, AfricanAmericans and Asian-Americans, all of whom must participate in
American government as individuals and not as members of self-governing
tribes. 0 2 It is only Native Americans---or, if you like, American
Americans-who are recognized to have tribes, which, as governments,
respect and advance local sensibilities every bit as much as the
governments that members of the dominant society more regularly think of:
cities, counties, states and the federal government.
It strikes me that the term is rather useful here in this article to
describe the straight community, for the community of gay men, lesbians,
bisexuals and transsexuals must feel themselves confronting most days of
their lives a dominant society that makes choices fundamentally different
from the ones they make. Thus in a very real way, the issue of gaymarriage recognition presents cross-boundary differences such as those that
we who deal in Indian law confront every day. Which is not to say, of
course, that the two "dominant societies" are the same. There are gay

101.
I discussed these issues in greater detail in Robert Laurence, Symmetry and
Asymmetry in American Indian Law, 42 ARtz. L. REV. 861 (2000).
102.
Justice Scalia would have us all be unhyphenated Americans. See Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 246 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring and dissenting).
"In the eyes of government, we are just one race here. It is American." Id. It is entirely
unclear that Justice Scalia would accomplish that by undoing all of what we call American
Indian law. Adarand was not an Indian law case.
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Indians; just as surely there are
Indian tribes to whom gay-marriage
03
recognition would be abhorrent. 1
One difficulty with gay-marriage recognition that is so paramount that
it could hardly go without noting until the conclusion, is that the entire
legal debate is carried out against a backdrop of sin. That is to say that
many members of the dominant society see the activity-or, at the very
least, the sexual activity-that goes on in a gay marriage as being sinful.
The issue is then placed in the context of what Justice Scalia called in
Lawrence v. Texas "the culture wars, ' 4 a primary battle of which is
characterized as the increasing toleration by the dominant society of
deviant behavior.' 0 5 From the perspective of the traditionalists, a large part
of the dominant society-those in the "that's not the way we do things
around here" camp, as well as the "live and let live" camp-have grown
accustomed to look at, through or around activities and attitudes that were
formerly more uniformly recognized as deviant
06 behavior, whether that be
forth.
so
or
use
drug
language,
activity,
sexual

103.
As is rather well known, some tribes, especially in the Plains, accepted, at least
in the old days, the propriety of the berdache, meaning a man who took on woman's dress,
engaged in women's activities around the village, and accepted male sexual partners, See
Harriet Whitehead, The Bow and the Burden Strap: A New Look at Institutionalized
Homosexuality in Native North America, in SEXUAL MEANINGS 80-115 (Sherry B. Ortner &
Harriet Whitehead, eds. 1981). A popular portrayal of such a person is found in the movie
LITTLE BIG MAN (Paramount 1970). Professor Whitehead notes that in cultures such as the
Plains and Southwest Indians, it was much easier to be a man cross-dressing as a female,
than for a woman to go in the opposite direction. For an example of a woman who tried to
cross-dress up the hierarchical stream, and was burned for the attempt, one need look no
farther than Jean d'Arc. In contemporary American society, though, the increasing
popularity of women's and girls' sports, the recent influx of women into such professions as
the military, the ministry, law and veterinary medicine, and the age-old acceptance of the
"tomboy" over the "sissy," all suggest that ours is a society in which it is easier for females
to cross-dress up the hierarchical stream; at least it's easier than it was in 15th Century
France. I am grateful to Gregory A. Laurence for raising the point made in this footnote,
and more generally for influencing this article. My nephew discussed these issues in a
thoughtful paper written for Professor Glenda Roberts in satisfaction of the requirements of
a course called "The World of Gender," offered by the Waseda University Graduate School
of Asia-Pacific Studies, Tokyo, Japan. A copy of the paper is on file in my office.
104.
Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105.
See, e.g., Bernard F. Kennetz Jr., Letter to the Editor, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, May 2, 2003, at B8.

106.
Notwithstanding Loving v. Virginia, not everyone has come to accept the
propriety of miscegenetic relationships. See Six N.F.L. Players Get Racial Threats, F.B.I.
Says, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2003, at D6 (reporting that "N.F.L. players, civic leaders and
entertainers" had received letters "threaten[ing] violence and instruct[ing] the players not to
date white women."). Id. Presumably, these letter writers would see an acceptance of
deviancy in the dominant society's increasingly easy toleration of such relationships.
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From an Indian law perspective, there is something profoundly ironic
about portraying this trend toward the tolerance of deviance as new. For
surely much of what we now consider to be quite acceptable vestiges of
pre-contact Indian culture was not so long ago seen as deviant behavior.
Indians spoke Indian languages, practiced Indian religions, wore shoes
without heels, ate fry bread and beans, and hunted and gathered, rather than
tilling the soil as God intended men should do. It is well known that not so
long ago as such things are measured, the government cut the hair of young
Indian boys and beat them for speaking their native tongues, drumming
their deviant behavior out of them, or trying to. When Elvira G. Platt, who
was a teacher to the Pawnees in the 1860s, wrote that "[t]he boys ... are
rapidly gaining sufficient moral courage ... to permit us to clip off their
scalp lock, which is their badge of bravery, without keeping on their hats to
hide its loss,',' 1 7 her appraisal that the students' submission took, not just
courage, but moral courage, was telling.
So there are people now who are quite tolerant of the desire of Indian
men to wear their hair in long braids, or to practice their traditional
religions, or to hold on as their native languages die out, but who decry the
acceptance of the gays among us as a new and intolerable tolerance of
deviance. Should we not have shown more tolerance earlier for the nowunderstandable desire of Indians to speak their own languages and keep to
their traditional ways, one asks. "Yes," is the reply, "but this is different.
This is . . .homosexuality. This is a sin." But the dominant society has
often characterized as sin the deviations from its own sensibilities;
advocating heliocentrism was considered heresy in Galileo's day.10 8 And
surely the boarding school principals of the prior centuries were just as
certain as today's traditionalists are that their work to turn the Indians into
good Christian farmers was a battle against both sin and deviance.
The truth must be this: in every community there is a dominant society
with its own closely held beliefs, while there is also a segment of the same
community that holds different ways dear. And in every generation, it
must be the case that the conflicts between these two groups are fought out
both in the law courts and in the churches and coffee shops. The conflict
between Indian tribes and the North American dominant society has been
going on for more than five hundred years. And, as I hope this essay has
shown, the course of that battle, its principles and its compromises, indeed

107.
Document No. 132 in Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs (1863)
(from Elmira G. Platt to Benjamin F. Lushbaugh).

108.
See DAVA SOBEL, GALILEO's DAUGHTER: A HISTORICAL MEMOIR OF SCIENCE,
FAITH, AND LOVE (1999).
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has something to say about the battles that lie ahead regarding gaymarriage recognition.

